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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890549-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, 
the case, and the facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court's jurisprudence over post-Gibbons guilty 
pleas is consistent: it calls for strict compliance with Rule 11 
in the entry of the plea. Because this is a post-Gibbons guilty 
plea and the trial court did not comply with the plain 
requirements of Rule 11, the entry of the plea was improper. 
This issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
In twice emphasizing Appellant's criminal record, which 
was already in the court file, the prosecutor effectively argued 
against Appellant's motion for diminished sentencing. This issue 
focuses on a broken contract between the prosecutor and 
Appellant, rather than the trial court's sentencing decision. 
Because the prosecutor failed to honor his contractual duty, 
Appellant is entitled to reversal. This issue may be raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
1 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF RULE 11 
RENDERS THE ENTRY OF APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
INVALID. 
Since the Gibbons decision was written, this Court has 
consistently maintained the rule that in accepting guilty pleas, 
1 
trial courts must comply strictly with the Rule 11. As 
explained by the Gibbons court, the purposes of the strict 
compliance rule are 
to assist trial judges in making the 
constitutionally required determination that 
the defendant's plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and will tend to discourage, or at 
least facilitate swift disposition of, post-
conviction attacks on the validity of guilty 
pleas because the trial judge will have 
produced a clearly adequate record for 
review. 
Id. at 1314. 
The State does not attack the policies behind the 
strict compliance rule, but indicates that this Court should re-
evaluate that rule inasmuch as the State perceives 
inconsistencies in applications of that rule. Appellee's brief 
at 12-15. 
For purposes of clarification, it is helpful to divide 
the cases discussed by the State into three categories: 1) pre-
Gibbons cases applying the "record as a whole" test; 2) post-
Gibbons cases applying the strict compliance rule; and 3) post-
Gibbons cases applying the "record as a whole" test. 
1 E.g. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Ct.App.); cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
2 
In the first category of cases, the pre-Gibbons cases 
applying the "record as a whole" test, the court behaved in a 
manner paralleling the State's argument in this case, evaluating 
the voluntariness of plea entries with all available factors 
(plea affidavits, representation by counsel, intelligence of the 
defendant, prior experience in the criminal justice system, 
x 2 
etc.) . 
In the second category of cases, the post-Gibbons cases 
applying the strict compliance rule, are cases such as State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App.); cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988), and State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 
1989). These cases, like Gibbons, indicate that relying on a 
2 See State v. Jolivet, 784 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah August 
22, 1989)(Mr. Jolivet's convictions and sentences were affirmed 
in 1986 (before Gibbons); court applied "record as a whole 
test"). 
The court's failure to point out the date of Mr. 
Jolivet's convictions in light of its decision to apply the 
record as a whole test is not an indication that the court was 
abandoning Gibbons. See State v. Vasilacopulos, 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988)(denying petition for writ of certiorari); State v. 
Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah August 17, 1989)(per curiam, 
with Justice Stewart concurring in the result)(characterizing 
Gibbons as a "clear break with the past", and declining to apply 
it retroactively). 
Apparently, the Hickman court accepted the State's 
argument presented in its brief in that case (No. 880362): 
Prior to Gibbons, this Court had always 
applied the Brooks-Warner record as a whole 
test. This Court should adopt the position 
taken by the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988), rehearing denied, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(1988), cert, denied 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1988); that Gibbons represents a clear break 
with the past in application of a procedural 
rule and that it will not be retroactively 
applied. 
State's Hickman brief at 7, included in Appendix 1 of this brief. 
3 
defendant's representation by an attorney and on a plea 
affidavit are not sufficient to satisfy Rule 11, but that the 
trial court must make a thorough personal inquiry of the 
3 defendant at the time the plea is entered. 
The third category of cases, the post-Gibbons cases 
applying the "record as a whole" test# contains opinions such as 
this Court's decision in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah 
App. 1989). The reason this opinion does not apply the Rule 11 
strict compliance rule, or rely on Gibbons, Vasilacopulos, or 
Valencia is that the issue raised by Mr. Thurston was that he had 
4 
misunderstood the plea bargain; it did not pertain to the trial 
5 
court's conduct during the plea hearing. 
Appellant's issue addressed in Point II of Appellant's 
opening and reply briefs, concerning the prosecutor's failure to 
honor the plea agreement, is yet another example of an issue 
justifying withdrawal of the guilty plea that is unrelated to the 
3 See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313-1314 (Utah 
1987); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988); 
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334-1335 (Utah App. 1989). 
4 Mr. Thurston thought when the prosecution agreed to 
recommend probation, the agreement was binding on all state 
agencies, including Adult Probation and Parole. Ici. at 1298. 
5 Indeed, it appears that the trial court complied with 
Rule 11. This Court explained, 
The record here establishes that 
defendant was fully informed of his rights 
and the consequences of his guilty plea. The 
judge, pursuant to Rule 11, informed 
defendant of his rights to trial and against 
self-incrimination, and related to him the 
potential consequences of his guilty plea. 
Id. at 1302. 
4 
Rule 11 strict compliance test set forth in Gibbons* In short, 
Thurston neither relates to, nor calls into question Gibbons, 
Vasilacopulos or Valencia. 
Because the record in this post-Gibbons Rule 11 case 
demonstrates that the trial court failed to meet its burden under 
Rule 11, Appellant may raise this issue for the first time on 
appeal, and is entitled to relief. See Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 
1334 (Utah App. 1989)("'Although the issue here was first raised 
on appeal by appellant, in certain cases we may consider the 
failure to comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error 
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised on 
appeal to this court. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-
42 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)("It was error, 
plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept 
petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it 
was intelligent and voluntary.")). 
II. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S EFFECTUAL 
VIOLATION OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
In response to Appellant's argument that the 
prosecutor, in twice emphasizing Appellant's criminal record, 
which was already in the trial court's file, effectually violated 
the plea agreement (which bound the prosecutor to refrain from 
opposing Appellant's motion for a diminished sentence), the State 
argues that there was no violation of the plea agreement, and 
that if there were, Appellant should have given the trial court 
the opportunity to fashion a remedy. 
5 
As the cases cited in footnote 9 of Appellant's 
opening brief indicate# the fact that a prosecutor is indirect in 
violating a plea bargain does not make the violation any more 
acceptable. Even if the violation of the agreement was 
accidental, the result of the violation is the invalidation of 
the plea agreement. State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). 
The record in the instant case demonstrates the 
prosecutor's violation of the plea agreement, and clarifies the 
State characterization of the prosecutor's two redundant 
summaries of Appellant's criminal record as "innocuous 
statements", made "in response to questions by the judge", "not 
rising to the level of argument or advocacy". Appellee's brief 
at 7# 23. 
The first "question" asked by the trial court to evoke 
the "innocuous" summary of Appellant's criminal record was as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Well, the drug crimes are just 
horrendous. 
(T. 7). The prosecutor's second summary of Appellant's criminal 
record, came in response to the question, "Mr. Ellett, do you 
wish to be heard?" (T. 17). 
The State's argument that sentencing decisions should 
be well-informed is well taken. However, inasmuch as Appellant's 
criminal record was already in the court's file, the prosecutor's 
summaries of Appellant's criminal record did not provide any 
evidence necessary for sentencing. Rather, they constituted a 
violation of the plea agreement not to oppose Appellant's motion 
6 
for diminished sentencing. 
The waiver cases and argument presented by the State do 
not apply to this issue because when the issue arose, it was 
already beyond the trial court's power to remedy. When the 
prosecutor made the improper arguments, he violated the plea 
bargain, invalidating it. E.g. United States v. Grandinetti, 564 
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977)(M[T]he sentence must ... be vacated if 
the agreement was not kept because the defendant offers his plea 
not in exchange for the actual sentence or impact on the judge, 
but for the prosecutor's statements in court."). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate Appellant's conviction and 
sentence, and remand this case to the trial court so that 
Appellant can withdraw his plea. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 1990. 
JAMES A. V 
Attorneyifior Appellant 
Attormey 
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circumstances as a whole support Judge Daniels' finding that the 
plea was voluntary. See Warner v. Morrisf 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 
1985), and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). Judge 
Daniels received a full explanation of the plea agreement in open 
court (R. 238 at 2-3). He also established that defendant pled 
guilty because he was guilty (R. 238 at 7); leading to a logical 
inference that defendant was not pleading guilty due to threats 
or inducements. Finally, defendant executed an affidavit in open 
court that specifically states that w[n]o promises or threats of 
any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty." (R. 21). 
Defendant cites State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987) for the proposition that the trial judge was required to 
question defendant on the record about promises or threats. 
Gibbons was decided three years after defendant pled guilty. 
Prior to Gibbons
 # this Court had always applied the Brooks-Warner 
record as a whole test. This Court should adopt the position 
taken by the Court of Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)/ rehearing denied, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(1988), cert, denied 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988); that Gibbons 
represents a clear break with the past in application of a 
procedural rule and that it will not be retroactively applied. 
7-
